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Abstract
I estimate the impact of political violence (i.e. terrorism) and domestic violence (i.e. intimate
partner violence) on child health outcomes. Given that there is a strand of literature showing that
armed conflicts, and thus, political violence, increase the likelihood of violence within a house-
hold, I test for this possible link as well as the combined effect of these two types of violence on
children’s height. I find a separate negative effect of both violence outcomes on children’s height,
but an insignificant combined effect of these two types of violence. Thus, mothers experiencing
violence through the partner and violence in their environment through terrorism, have children
not significantly shorter than others.
Keywords: Armed Conflicts, Domestic Violence, Children’s Health
JEL-Classification: I12, O12
1. Introduction
Armed conflicts have long-lasting impacts on health outcomes, especially child health outcomes
during and after pregnancy but also in the first five years of their young lives. Armed conflicts
typically reduce access to health infrastructures and worsen the living situation of the household.
However, even after controlling for these conditions (Mansour and Reese 2012, Parlow 2013), armed
conflicts have a significant effect on child (and maternal) health outcomes and this effect is usually
explained by stress experienced during and after pregnancy. Though, the actual source of that stress
is not clear, e.g. it is usually attributed to the fear of experiencing conflict violence (Camacho 2008,
Parlow 2013). What if this source lies within the household, e.g. due to domestic violence (i.e.
intimated partner violence) experienced during pregnancy and beyond.
There is a large body of literature, mainly from the medical field, showing that domestic vio-
lence experienced during pregnancy has adverse effects on pregnancy related health outcomes (e.g.
Janssen et al. 2003, Koski et al. 2011, Athusen et al. 2015). However, a few working papers
can be found in the development economics literature (Agu¨ero 2013, Rawlings and Siddique 2014).
These adverse effects include abortion, still-births, complications at birth in general but also low
birth weight (Mavalankar, Gray, and Trivedi 1992, Valladares et al. 2002, Aizer 2011) - a known
indicator for long-term health outcomes of the newly born. Furthermore, mothers who suffer from
domestic violence are less likely to go to prenatal check ups as well as neonatal check ups. Even
when the children get older, these mothers are often less capable to presume their duties. Thus,
even if the child itself is not abused, by having an abused mother, their physical development can
be impaired (e.g. height), additionally to their emotional development (Holt, Buckley and Whelan
2008).
In conjunction, there is a growing body of literature showing a relationship between armed
conflicts and the probability of experiencing domestic violence at home (La Mattina 2017). Men
are typically less employed in areas of armed conflict or experience more stress in general. They can
be harassed by officials or drawn into possible hostile actions by groups being involved in fighting.
These men may carry this type of stress home and could be more likely to beat or humiliate their
wives.
Here, I am using Pakistan as a case study to link these two bodies of literature to possible
explain the black box stress. Pakistan is a country experiencing armed conflict related violence
as what is defined as political violence, e.g. multiple political and terrorist groups opposed the
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government and fight the government on a daily basis.
My analysis is based on the 2012 / 13 Demographic and Health Survey for Pakistan (PDHS)
containing for the first time a module on domestic violence within the household. In combining the
information on the location of the household with data on terrorism in the provinces, I can identify
households more affected by external violence than others. Thus, I am able to estimate a causal
effect of armed conflict-related violence on child health outcomes in a first step. In a second step I
estimate the effect of external violence on the likelihood of domestic violence and finally combine
these two types of violence to test for an effect on child health outcomes. I find, however, that
although external violence reduces child health, as well as increases the likelihood of certain types
of domestic violence (e.g. stronger forms), the combined effect has no significant effect on child
health for children living in these households. This is surprising, given that these two channels for
themselves reduces child health. Yet, for the household experiencing this double burden on their
livelihoods, certain coping mechanism could be in place, reducing the negative effect on child health.
For instance, Nobles, Frankenberg and Thomas (2015) find that communities experiencing negative
weather shocks, assists each other to overcome the daily obstacles. Bellows and Miquel (2009) and
Voors et al. (2012) find that individuals are more altruistic and involved in their community after
an armed conflict ended. Given, that women are more likely to experience domestic violence in
provinces experiencing more external violence, this could bond the households together in finding
mechanisms to assist each other.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I discuss the related literature and analyze the
possible link between types of violence on child health outcomes further. In section 3 I introduce
the data and describe my empirical model. The discussion of my results follows in section 4, while
in section 5 I perform a series of robustness checks. The paper concludes in section 5.
2. Related Work
2.1. Health shocks early in life
There is a large body of literature showing that health shocks early in life have long-lasting
adverse effects on health outcomes throughout the life of an individual (Barker 1998, Case 2005,
Strauss and Thomas 2008, Maccini and Yang 2009, Almond and Currie 2011). These individuals are
typically sicker on the average, less satisfied with their health and even die earlier, and thus, have
lower labor market outcomes and higher health related expenses over their life cycle. These health
shocks can include recessions (Cutler et al. 2002), famines (Stein et al. 1975, Almond et al. 2008),
2
droughts (Akresh and Verwimp 2006), pandemics (Almond 2006), wildfires (Jayachandran 2008),
and many more. They can have direct health effects, like through reduced air quality during a wild
fire but also more indirectly through reduced access to other resources needed. Furthermore, these
external shocks cause stress. Armed conflicts like wars, civil wars, and weaker forms of violence
typically worsen the living situation of the households by reducing access to health services, food,
and cause stress for the members of the households. These indirect effects of armed conflict,
especially on child health outcomes, have been in focus of research in development economics for
more than ten years now.
These children usually have lower birth weight or are smaller at birth when the health shock
occurs during pregnancy (Camacho 2008, Mansour and Rees 2012) and affects the development of
the fetus. During the first five years of the development of the children their health is measured by
height, weight or a combination of these two. Thus, if children experience an adverse health shock,
they tend to be smaller for their age (Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009, Guerrero-Serdan
2009, Akresh and Verwimp 2011, Akresh, Lucchetti and Thirumurthy 2012, Galdo 2013).
However, even after controlling for living conditions and access to health services, a negative
effect of the conflict experience remains. This is typically explained by stress experienced during
pregnancy, e.g. through changing hormones and impaired fetal development, or by stress experi-
enced during the first few years of the child’s life (Mansour and Rees 2012, Parlow 2013). Yet,
the actual source of that stress is not clear. Is it the fear of losing your life, the daily struggle
with the worsened living conditions or is the source actually within the household? One potential
source within the household and having direct consequences on maternal health and child’s health,
is domestic violence experienced.
Mothers experiencing domestic violence during pregnancy are more likely to have birth com-
plications, still-births or psychological problems (Mavalankar, Gray, and Trivedi 1992, Valladares
et al. 2002, Holt, Kishor and Johnson 2006, Buckley and Whelan 2008, Aizer 2011). Furthermore,
besides having birth defects, these babies also have lower birth weight. However, the negative con-
sequences of domestic abuse continue to impair the development of the child during the first years of
life, directly through reduced parental ability of the mothers but also indirectly, by watching their
mothers being abused, and thus, having emotional scars, lasting their entire life. These children are
also more likely to be abused as well (see Holt, Buckley and Whelan 2008 for an excellent overview).
Besides having emotional problems, these children have reduced health measured by more objective
3
measures like lower BMIs or reduced height, a long-term indicator for health outcomes later in life
(Agu¨ero 2013, Rawlings and Siddique 2014, Nuhu 2016).
These papers use different DHS-surveys and find that not all forms of domestic violence have
the same effect on health outcomes, e.g. stronger forms like physical violence have a larger impact
than emotional abuse. They also find that the health effects are more pronounced for lower income
households as well as mothers with less education, a known finding from developed countries (Aizer
2011).
Given that height is an established measure for long-term health outcomes, and that both armed
conflict and domestic violence can reduces this particular health outcome, I want to link these two
violence outcomes to test their impact on child health.
2.2. Linking domestic violence and armed conflict
It has been estimated by the World Health Organization (WHO) that one out of three women
experience domestic violence (i.e. intimate partner violence) in their life time (WHO 2005, 2013).
Domestic violence can range from sexual, psychological to physical violence (Ali et al. 2015). This
is an issue not just in developing countries and poses a public health risk including direct health
related costs as well as indirect costs, at the societal level. Yet, the prevalence rates of domestic
violence are significantly higher in developing countries.1
The reasons for domestic violence can be manifold, and there as such, are economic models
explaining domestic violence (DV) within the household context (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991,
Tauchen and Witte 1995). DV can be seen as instrument to exert power to induce or change
behavior of the victim (typically women) or sometimes even just an instrument to increases utility
by deriving pleasure from these actions. Still, DV changes the distribution of wealth within a
household towards the male perpetrator. In more modern settings DV is seen within bargaining
models where the ”normal” bargaining fails and violence is used as mean to maintain the own
position within the household.
Risk factors at the individual level can include low self esteem and being exposed to violence
during childhood can be reasons to be violent against someone’s partner (Tauchen and Witte 1991).
Further reasons are the usual suspects, low levels of education, unemployment (usually the male)
1According to the WHO (2013) in high-income countries ca. 23 percent of the women experience domestic violence
in their lifetime while in a low-income region like Southeast-Asia ca. 37 percent of the women experience domestic
violence in their life. On a more regular basis, numbers vary from 2 percent of the women in the US experience DV
regularly (Aizer 2011) while in Rwanda 32 percent do (La Mattina 2017).
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alcoholism and drug abuse and other channels inducing stress at the individual level (Averett
and Wang 2016). Risk factors at the household level typically include low income (Tauchen and
Witte 1991, WHO 2005, Aizer 2011).2 While at the societal level, traditional gender roles and
expectations play in developing countries a major role in committing domestic violence (WHO
2005, Finnoff 2012). Gender expectations are the main reason for the high rates of domestic
violence, and violence against women in general, in patriarchal societies like the one in Pakistan
(Aurant Foundation 2014, Ali et al. 2015).
DV also has been linked to armed conflicts (WHO 2005, Calderon, Gafaro and Ibanez 2011,
Finnoff 2012, Noe and Rieckmann 2013, Guiterrez and Gallegos 2016, Mattina 2017) given these
create stressful environments (e.g. through forced displacement, less access to resources), weaken
labor market conditions and increase the risk, especially for men, to be involved into these conflicts.3
Yet, La Mattina (2017) is the first who thoroughly analyzes possible causal links between armed
conflict and domestic violence.4 Finnoff (2012) however focuses mainly on female employment and
domestic violence. Her focus is not explicitly on the Rwandian genocide but in a robustness check
she controls for conflict intensity. Calderon, Gafaro and Ibanez (2011) analyze the consequences
of forced displacement caused by the Colombian conflict while Noe and Rieckmann (2013) use the
Colombian case to link conflict deaths to domestic violence at the household level. Finally, in a
different approach, Guiterrez and de Piura (2016) estimated the effect of conflict experience in
Peru during childhood on the probability of experiencing domestic violence during adulthood, e.g.
roughly 20 years later.
La Mattina (2017) uses the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to identify households more affected by the
genocide than others in 2005 and 2011 DHS data. With this variation in exposure to the genocide,
she is able to estimate a causal effect of the likelihood of women to experience domestic. Her data
set is very similar to the one I use, a standard DHS-data set including a module on different types
of domestic violence and their rough frequency. She finds that women who married after the end
of the genocide and living in high intensity conflict areas are more likely to experience DV. Why
do not leave these married women the household? La Mattina explains this by a change in sex
ratios in favor of the surviving men. Thus, male may have a higher bargaining power within the
2However, it should be noted, although that domestic violence is more common in low income households, it can
be observed over all income groups (Kishor and Johnson 2006).
3While this is a more indirect link, it has been known that for instance soldiers actively involved in fighting take
these experiences home (e.g. through PTSD) and are more likely to be violent at home (Cesur and Sabia 2016).
4Besides Finnoff (2012) the aforementioned studies are still at the working paper stage.
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household because women typically have no (outside) option to leave the dysfunctional marriage.
The effect of the genocide is therefore long-lasting. The effect of having no outside option can be
even stronger in patriarchal societies like Pakistan, where women who are leaving their men are
ousted up to the point, that there are even killed for their actions (e.g. honor killings)5.
3. Data, Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Strategy
3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate the impact of political violence and domestic violence and child health outcomes, I
utilize the Pakistan 2012/13 Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS). The PDHS is a nationally
representative household survey and contains a module on domestic violence. In total 13,588
ever-married women of age 15 to 49 were interviewed belonging to 3,134 households. The PHDS
contains standard demographic questions, a rich set of health related questions for mothers and
their children as well as a complete birth history of children born to mothers. For the first time
at the national level, this survey includes a module specific to the experience of domestic violence.
Here, a smaller sub sample of 3,687 women was randomly chosen and carefully interviewed (e.g.
without the husband being present). One third of these women experienced DV in their life and
one fifth of the women experience DV on a more regular basis. Typically, the own husband is the
perpetrator. These high levels of DV are common for Pakistan and are found for smaller samples
before (see Niaz, Hassan, and Tariq (2017) and Ali et al. (2017) for an overview).6 Women are
typically considered to be submissive to men and their role is often limited to that of a child bearer
(Ali et al. 2017). Although, there are many NGOs, like the Aurat Foundation, helping these women
and trying to raise awareness of domestic violence as an issue for the society as a whole, laws have
been protecting men for many years. Bills protecting the rights of women (and their children)
specifically were discussed in 2009 and 2012 but have not passed at the national level.7
The DV questions in the PDHS are based on the established Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus
1979). These contain questions of the type of hostile actions (verbal, physical), their frequency but
also questions if the hostile actions are warranted. A question from the PHDS reads like this: ”Did
your husband ever say or do something to harm you?”. Answers range from ever, often, sometimes
5For instance, in 2014 there were 713 reported honor killings in Pakistan. This number has been slowly increasing
since 2008 (Aurat Foundation 2014).
6Some studies report even rates up to 80 percent (Niaz, Hassan, and Tariq (2017)).
7However, laws protecting women can be found at the state level. The capital district Islamabad passed a similar
bill in 2012 and the Punjab province in 2016, strengthening the rights of women.
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and not in the last 12 months. Questions of the actual type of action (e.g. push, slap, punch and
so on) are similar. The extent and especially the type of actions vary between women, e.g. some
women are humiliated but never beaten and these rates very across regions. Thus, this regional
variation should be accounted for in the empirical analysis following (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
The province Punjab has higher rates of domestic violence than other provinces. Furthermore,
women do not experience the different types of DV at the same level, e.g. women who are beaten
more frequently are not necessarily humiliated in public. Thus, DV is a more private matter at
home.
[Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
Additionally, women experiencing domestic violence have lower levels of education, live in house-
holds with lower levels of incomes as well as in more rural areas. They also have more children and
are more pregnant on the average. Surprisingly, they are also younger on the average and likely
less experienced in handling their own position within the household (Table 2).
[Table 2 about here]
Violence in Pakistan is typically described as political violence, e.g. different groups expose the
government in organizing riots, abducting officials but also committing terror attacks. Yet, the
picture in Pakistan is more diverse and violence has different roots, from different political organi-
zations opposing each other or the government, groups opposing minority religions (e.g. sectarian
violence) but also terror organizations like Alquaida fighting a Jihad not just in Pakistan (e.g. in
India, Afghanistan) are present (Ismail and Amjad 2014, de Mesquita et al. 2015). For the purpose
of this study, I am interested in the extent of violence at the province level and thus affecting the
daily lives of households living in these provinces. Thus, I count the incidences using various sources
to identify high violence intense and low violence intense provinces. I am aware that identifying
districts for example would give a more precise picture, but I have just information on the location
of the household at the province level.8
8Although the PHDS offers a few hundred district codes, the documentation contains no information to identify
these districts. Furthermore, most data on political violence are collected at the province level.
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My primary source are the incidence data of the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP 2017).
Because of different definitions and sources of the incidences, I use ACLED and BFSR data to
double check the identification of provinces affected more by violence than others (ACLED 2017,
de Mesquita et al. 2015). These databases yet have in common, that most of the incidences are
from news media but coding rules and the level of detail differ.9 However, SATP is the only one
offering data on the years 2012 and 2013, e.g. the year the PHDS was collected, while the other two
data sources include data up to 2011 which could be used to describe long-run trends of violence in
Pakistan. SATP includes data on civilians, militants and security forces killed. I choose civilians
killed as my identifier, given this should affect expectations and experience of violence in the daily
lives of the households more than the numbers of militants killed or official security forces (Rehman
and Vanin 2017).
In Table 3 I present the data and Figure 2 shows a map of the violence against civilians. The
provinces mostly affected by above average absolute numbers of civilians killed are Sindh, Khyber,
Balochistan while Sindh could be classified as very high, given most of the political violence is
concentrated in this province.
[Table 3 and Figure 2 about here]
3.2. Empirical Strategy
My estimation strategy involves two steps. First I estimate the effect of armed conflict and
domestic violence on child health outcomes separately. In a second step I estimate a combined
effect including models using the interaction between armed conflict and domestic violence but also
armed conflict as a possible instrument for domestic violence. To do so, I test separately if armed
conflict increase domestic violence or not. Only if there is a strong link, it would be possible to use
an instrumental variable estimation.
To measure children’s health I use current height. It would be possible to use other health
outcomes and directly focusing around the time of birth, but using domestic violence limits the
analysis to the last 12 months and would create small samples. I estimate a standard reduced form
health production function of the following form:
9For instance, ACLED offers GPS data while SATP offers less detailed location data and summarizes them often
at the province level.
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Hijt = α+ γconflictij + δDVij + β1Childijt + β2motherijt + β3SESijt + ρj + θt + ijt (1)
Hijt is an indicator for children’s height and transformed to height for age z-score (HAZ) using the
WHO module for statistical programs. Hijt is therefore the HAZ score of child i living in region
j and born in year t.10 The average local treatment effect of experiencing armed conflict is γ,
where conflict is a binary variable indicating children born and living in a more conflict-affected
region. Different types of domestic violence are measured by the variable DV . These include being
humiliated, insulted, threatened or beaten by the husband. Because I am also interested in a causal
effect of armed conflict (i.e. political violence), I estimate the model as a linear probability model
(LPM). An LPM estimation allows the interpretation of γ as an average local treatment effect.
The vector child includes information on the child itself, e.g. the age and the sex. Information
on the mother like her age, education and height are summarized in the vector mother. Household
characteristics like wealth can be found in the vector SES. I use birth year (θt) and region fixed
effects (ρj) to account for variations across regions and across birth cohorts . Other fixed effects
could even include mother fixed effects. Standard robust errors are used ijt. In a different set of
estimations, I cluster the standard errors at the community level to use information on possible
linkages at the community level, e.g. if households (and their mothers) develop coping mechanism
to deal with the hardships at hand.
4. Results
4.1. The effect of armed conflict on children’s height
In Table 5 I present the results of the effect of political violence on HAZ scores of children
between the age 0 to 59 months. For comparison purposes, I show baseline models not including
the conflict variable.
The effect of political violence, a form of armed conflict, on children’s height is negative. This
has also been found in similar work. The reduction in height is similar in magnitude compared to
other weaker forms of armed conflict (Parlow 2013). Children exposed to armed conflict are up
to 1.4 standard deviations (ca. 2.8cm) shorter than children who are not (or less) exposed. The
10The dependent variable is a standardized height score which allows the interpretation of the violence coefficient
directly as a reduction in standard deviations from the reference population. A one standard deviation difference is
approximately 2 cm.
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inclusion of fixed effects shows that the effect is higher in magnitude.
Other control variables have the assumed effect on children’s height. Taller mothers have taller
children, yet, the effect is not as pronounced as in the literature. However, education has a larger
effect on the height of children. Educated mothers typically raise their children healthier and can
cope more effectively with the daily hardships. In Pakistan, where women barely have education
at all, having some education (e.g. at the primary level) can make a significant difference in raising
children.11 Thus, the positive effect of wealth on children’s height does come to no surprise as
well. Wealthier households are typically better educated but also have access to more resources.
However, the effect on health outcomes is typically not the same across wealth quintiles. I leave
the effect of being in different wealth quintiles for a robustness check.
[Table 5 about here]
4.2. The effect of domestic violence on children’s height
I have use four different measures of domestic violence against the mother: being humiliated,
insulted, threatened and actually beaten at home (see Table 6). I expect different effects on
children’s height, given these domestic violence forms differ in their severity. I do find that mothers
who are more frequently beaten have children with worse height outcomes. These children grow up
in an environment adverse to their own development and mothers are likely impaired in fulfilling
their duties towards the child. Additionally, children can also suffer by watching their mother being
abused.
These children are ca. 0.5 cm shorter compared to children who have mothers who are not beaten
frequently. Surprisingly, although only 17 percent of the women who are beaten answer that they
are threatened by their husbands, being threatened has a similar impact on child’s height. This
could be due to the fear of eventually being beaten, e.g. if the husbands threatens to beat his
wife an action is likely to follow. It is also possible that that women may underreport the level
of aggression of the husband. It is difficult to imagine that husbands who frequently beat their
women do not threaten them with a similar frequency. Especially, given that being insulted and
being humiliated overlap significantly more with each other.12 Yet, these weaker forms of domestic
11In my sample almost 50 percent of the women have no education. These women can also not read and write.
12The correlation between these two outcomes is higher than between being beaten and being threatened (see
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violence outcomes have no significant impact on the height of children.
[Table 6 and Table 7 about here]
4.3. The effect of both violence measures on children’s height
Above I found a negative effect of political violence and different types of domestic violence on
children’s height. Here I test if including both measures affects the individual results and if there
is an omitted variable bias by only using one of each in previous work or not.
La Mattina (2017) shows in a detailed discussion that domestic violence outcomes in Rwanda
are affected by the armed conflict experienced and this even with a long lasting impact. It could
be assumed, that more current armed conflict outcomes should affect current domestic violence
outcomes. In Table 8 I show results for my above models including both measures of violence. I
find similar results as above for models including just one of these outcomes. Using a Wald test to
compare the coefficients shows that they are not significantly different from each other compared
to the above models. This could mean that an omitted variables bias does not exists and that the
experience of armed conflict and domestic violence are rather weakly related with each other and
actually two different sources of stress. I come back to this question later, when I explore the effect
of armed conflict on domestic violence itself further, e.g. in taking up the discussion started by La
Mattina.
[Table 8 about here]
Another strategy to test the effect of political violence and domestic violence on children’s height is
to identify households experiencing both adverse outcomes at once. Thus, I include an interaction
term in my estimation (see Table 9). For households experiencing these two outcomes, I find no
significant effect on children’s height. This is cumbersome at first, because both violence measures
for themselves can have a significant effect and cause children to be shorter. However, it is possible
that if a household experiences these two outcomes of violence at once, women find coping mecha-
nisms to deal with these negative shocks to their daily lives. One strategy is to seek help from other
women living in the same community. It has been found that communities experiencing adverse
Table 7)
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external outcomes in their lives, find together and help each other to cope with the consequences
of a Tsunami or the experience of armed conflict (Nobles, Frankenberg and Thomas (2015), Voors
et al. (2012), and Bellows and Miquel (2009)).
[Table 9 about here]
4.4. Exploring the effect of armed conflict on domestic violence
In this section I explore the possible relationship between domestic violence and the armed
conflict in Pakistan further. La Mattina (2017) finds for Rwanda that the experience of armed
conflict has a long-lasting impact on some domestic violence outcomes, e.g. the stronger forms like
being beaten or in some cases being threatened. Here, I use armed conflict outcomes in the last 12
months to explain domestic violence during the same time period. While La Mattina argues that the
experience of armed conflict alters the perception towards violence more permanently, I argue that
armed conflict is another source of stress experienced and thus increases the likelihood of domestic
violence. Basically, I want to find an explanation why in my above models armed conflict and
domestic violence have separate effects on children’s health and may not be used interchangeably.
To test the effect of political violence on domestic violence, I use a standard linear probability
estimation of the following form:13
DVij = α+ γconflictj + βwomeni + θhusbandi + δSESi + ij (2)
DVi is a variable indicating the domestic violence experience of woman i living in region j in the
last 12 months. The variable conflict is the armed conflict outcome living in region j. Standard
information on the wife and on the husband can be found in the variable women and husband.
Household characteristics are included in the variable SES.
The results can be found in Table 10. I find that political violence has a weak effect on do-
mestic violence outcomes. Furthermore, the experience of armed conflict does not necessarily has
to increase the likelihood of domestic violence within a household. Only for being beaten I find
that the risk increases by roughly 2 percent. This is not a large effect, especially compared to
reasons for domestic violence which can be found within the household, e.g. alcoholism (up to
13It is also possible to use a probit (or logit) model. The marginal effects of the Probit models are virtually the
same to the LPM results reported here.
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20 percent). Alcoholism, employment status and similar variables are the usual suspects why a
husband is violent towards is wife. Thus, this relative low correlation between these two violence
outcomes can explain why in my above health models, the inclusion of these two is not a problem
and an omitted variable bias is not present. Moreover, the weak relationship between the conflict
experience and domestic violence outcomes is surprising.14 Especially, given that households have
been experiencing political violence in Pakistan for a long time. If one time shocks, like the one in
Rwanda, alter perceptions permanently, someone would expect a similar result for a more frequent
experience. Thus, I see the armed conflict experience as another source of stress and the reasons
for domestic violence are different ones.
[Table 10 about here]
Above I showed that including both measures of violence does not change the results significantly.
Thus, these two are very likely to be independent sources of stress experienced. Yet, imagine
someone would use an empirical model only including the domestic violence measure. It could be
argued omitting an armed conflict measure could bias the results, because armed conflict affects
children’s height and could affect domestic violence outcomes. I already showed that in my case
this may not be the case. A more convincing strategy is, assuming OVB exists and using an instru-
mental variable approach to overcome this issue. I instrument domestic violence by alcoholism of
the father and test for endogeneity. If endogeneity exists it could be because of omitting a relevant
variable. Reverse causality (or simultaneity) may also be reason but it is very unlikely in my case
where I explain height outcomes of children by domestic violence experienced by their mothers.
I report first and second stage results of an IV regression for the relevant variables in Table 11.
Alcoholism is indeed a valid instrument for domestic violence but in none of the models, endogene-
ity is present. I cannot reject the hypothesis of a Wu-Hausmann Test for endogeneity. Thus, my
above height models are at least not suffering by omitted variable bias and it is safe to use politi-
cal violence and domestic violence in the same empirical model or even to exclude domestic violence.
[Table 11 about here]
14Another hint may already be the weak correlation between the conflict experience and domestic violence outcomes,
e.g. they range from -0.03 for being threatened to 0.04 for being beaten in the last 12 months.
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5. Sensitivity analyses
In this section I test if my results remain relatively robust to alternative specifications. These
can include testing the above for different wealth quintiles, different fixed effects or accounting for
possible community effects in using clustered standard errors.
Households in various wealth quintiles are likely to cope differently with negative experiences
in their life, like an armed conflict. Furthermore, Kishor and Johnson (2006) show that the expe-
rience of domestic violence is not necessarily observed only for poor households but can be found
for all levels of wealth (and even education). In Table 12 I test the role of different wealth levels.
I only report the estimates on the armed conflict and domestic violence variable. I find that the
experience of political violence varies across wealth with surprisingly a U-shaped distribution, e.g.
the poorest suffer less than the households in the middle distribution. It is possible that for the
poorest who lack many resources, another worsening of the living situation is easier to handle than
for households who have access to some resources. These resources often include basic items like
access to a toilet or clean water. Yet, as someone would expect, the wealthiest households and their
children are less affected by the armed conflict than the poorer also experiencing the conflict. The
estimates for domestic violence show that the results before are mainly driven by households at the
very low end of the wealth distribution. The frequency of beating, for instance, is also higher in
poorer households.
[Table 12 about here]
My results show that older children are shorter than younger children. This could be because of
negative events which took place around the time of birth (or even pregnancy). This can include
indeed the experience of armed conflict of the mother during her pregnancy. Yet, I have no exact
information of the length of pregnancy. To overcome this issue, I use birth year by region fixed
effects. Before I used them separately. I find stronger results for the conflict variable (Table 13).
However, including these effects also introduces high levels of multicollinearity in my models and
affecting the standard errors of my conflict variable. Typically, households do not move often and
live today in the same provinces at the time of the pregnancy. The conflict variable would capture
the same information as birth year region fixed effects, especially when conflict levels are very sim-
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ilar years ago which I showed above. In this case using violence measure at the district level would
make these estimates surely more precise but the PDHS does not offer this type of information.15
[Table 13 about here]
Above I found an insignificant combined effect of political violence and domestic violence on chil-
dren’s height and argued that this could be because of strong community ties. These ties could also
be a reason why not all domestic violence measures show a significant effect on children’s health.
It is possible to account for ties in clustering the standard errors at the community level. There are
500 of these clusters. In Table 14 results for my main models can be found. The standard errors
are more precise as before, e.g. there might be some clustering and accounting for this, can increase
the efficiency of the results. In addition, I cannot measure community ties directly, accounting for
these indirectly, improves the results and adds another explanation for the results found above.
[Table 14 about here]
It is still feasible to perform more tests. For instance, here I used the sample of women experiencing
domestic violence. The full sample would contain more households, and thus, more children.
However, the effect of armed conflict itself is already similar to other studies only focusing on
the negative consequences of armed conflict. I do not expect significantly different results from
doing so. Furthermore, I could use other health related outcomes like small at birth or outcomes
directly related to the pregnancy (still-births, prematurely born). I would need to change the
identification of households more affected by political violence, because the events experienced
during pregnancy (and time of birth) matter more in this case. Yet, I cannot go back further in
the experience of domestic violence as the last 12 months. The information on ever experiencing
domestic violence, may show, that DV is experienced more frequently, but would make to strong
assumptions on DV outcomes around the time of birth if birth (and pregnancy) took place before
2012. Thus, if I use the last 12 months I only have small samples of children who are still very young
15The PHDS offers district codes but information on the exact district are not available. If GPS data would be
available this would be another strategy to overcome this issues. In this case ACLED conflict data could be used to
identify households more affected by political violence. But then the issue of small samples would be created because
only a fraction of women were interviewed for the domestic violence module.
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and generalizing the results would be more difficult. Finally, I could use even more information of
the domestic violence module, e.g. like being kicked, slapped and many more. Though, I already
used the variables being answered by most of the women. Using more specific answers would also
reduce the sample size and make estimates likely less valid.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I estimate the impact of armed conflict and domestic violence on children’s height
in Pakistan. Pakistan is a country experiencing armed conflict in form of political violence for a long
time. Armed conflicts create a burden on households experiencing the conflict in their daily lives.
A similar burden is the experience of domestic violence. These two types of negative experiences
typically reduce children’s health outcomes, but yet, most studies focus on one of these outcomes,
but not if they are experienced at the same time.
Here, I estimate the effect of these two sources of stress and find they have negative impacts
on children’s height for household experiencing either one of them. However, and unexpected, I
find that household suffering from armed conflict but also domestic violence do not have children
significantly shorter. This can be because of possible ties at the community level where mothers
support each other.
Furthermore, I find that domestic violence is not significantly affected by the experience of
political violence. A relative new strand of literature (e.g. La Mattina 2017) argues that external
armed conflicts increase the likelihood of domestic violence within a household. Surprisingly, by
the experience of armed conflict in the past. Here, I have current violence outcomes and do not
find a convincing effect on domestic violence. Yet, these two are very likely independent sources of
stress experienced in the household and cannot be used interchangeably nor can be armed conflict
used as an instrument for domestic violence in estimating the impact on children’s health.
Future research could estimate the impact on other health outcomes and not just for children,
e.g. maternal health outcomes or adult health outcomes and explore the effect of armed conflict
on domestic violence further. From a public policy point of view, households experiencing armed
conflict or domestic violence should be targeted by aid projects to reduce the consequences on the
health of children early in their lives.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Intensity of Domestic Violence across Provinces and Types - Ever
Very high
High
Medium
Low
No data
Intensity
Beaten Threatened
Humiliated Insulted
These averages are based on the Pakistan 2012/13 DHS and can be found in Table 1.
Figure 2: Intensity of Political Violence against Civilians - 2011 to 2013
2011
Very high
High
Medium
Low
No data
Intensity
2012
2013
High intensity refers to annual incidences above 300. Very high intensity above 800 incidences. These counts
are civilians who died because of political violence in a given year.
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Table 1: Different types of domestic violence across the provinces - Averages
Beaten Threatened Humiliated Insulted
Punjab 0,118 0,049 0,261 0,279
Sindh 0,070 0,014 0,092 0,094
Khyber 0,197 0,027 0,258 0,362
Balochistan 0,214 0,054 0,342 0,339
Gilgit 0,051 0,006 0,102 0,078
Islamabad 0,169 0,058 0,229 0,311
Own calculations based on the PHDS 2012/13.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All Conflict Beaten Threatened Humiliated Insulted
Mother
Age 32.69 32.69 33.53 32.15 33.44 33.47
Education 43.76 35.20 30.96 29.99 33.83 36.62
Working 19.87 17.71 28.44 33.33 27.42 26.38
Pregnant 11.03 11.84 13.97 14.17 13.40 12.75
Household
Urban 46.84 47.22 38.27 38.58 36.97 39.77
Wealth 3.11 2.97 2.62 2.66 2.76 2.83
Children born 3.70 3.79 4.51 4.37 4.48 4.41
Living children 3.33 3.42 4.00 3.62 3.91 3.90
Child
Male 52.08 51.96 52.09 53.81 51.64 51.76
Age 29.86 30.20 31.49 31.01 31.36 31.16
Height in mm 800.50 777.78 808.17 809.35 806.25 808.26
Weight in kg 10.70 10.42 10.99 10.64 10.93 11.09
Small at Birth 19.42 20.10 25.52 24.65 21.43 21.50
Own calculations based on the PHDS 2012/13. Conflict refers to provinces with high levels of political violence. Beaten,
threatened, humiliated and insulted are different measures of domestic violence. Education refers to share of women having
higher than primary education.
Table 3: SATP Data on Political Violence - Civilians killed - 2011 to 2013
Province 2011 2012 2013
Balochistan 542 690 718
Fata 488 549 319
Khyber 511 363 603
Gilgit 4 27 12
Azad Kashmir 0 1 0
Punjab 110 59 64
Sindh 1082 1318 1285
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Table 5: Baseline regressions - Political Violence
Baseline Conflict
Conflict -.527*** -1.391*** -1.404***
(.067) ( .123) ( .121)
Child’s sex -.115* -.123** -.119** -.128** -.123*** -.119**
(.065) (.062) ( .061) (.064) (.062) ( .061)
Child’s age -.025*** -.024*** -.057*** -.024*** -.024*** -.057***
( .0020) (.001) ( .008) (.002) ( .001) ( .008)
Mother’s height .005*** .004*** .004*** .005*** .004*** .004***
( .000) (.000) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000)
Mother’s age .008 .012** .013*** .008 .012** .013**
(.005) ( .005) (.005) ( .005) ( .005) ( .005)
Mother’s education .290*** .178** .183** .211*** .178** .183**
( .081) (.080) ( .078) (.081) ( .080) ( .078)
Urban -.232*** -.093 -.097 -.178** -.093 -.097
(.074) (.078) (.076) (.074) ( .078) (.076)
Wealth .274*** .230*** .221*** .258*** .230*** .221***
( .031) (.034) ( .034) ( .031) ( .034) ( .034)
Province FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Birthyear FE No No Yes No No Yes
n 3235 3235 3235 3235 3235 3235
R2 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.24
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Level of significance is *** 1 Percent, ** 5 Percent, * 10 Percent. Conflict is
a binary measure for provinces highly affected by political violence. Child age is measured in months and includes children up
to the age for 59 months. Sex refers to boys compared to girls. Mothers height is measured in cm. Mothers education is a
binary variable for having primary education.
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Table 7: Correlation between domestic violence measures
Humiliated Insulted Threatened Beaten
Humiliated 1.0000
Insulted 0.7311 1.0000
Threaten 0.3194 0.3171 1.0000
Beaten 0.5567 0.5562 0.3031 1.0000
Note: Based on the sample for children’s height. Overall correlation coefficients for the full sample are very similar.
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Table 10: Probability of experiencing domestic violence
Type of DV Humiliated Insulted Threatened Beaten
Conflict -.031** -.009 -.017*** .024**
(.014) ( .0149) (.006) ( .011)
Age -.002** -.002** -.001** -.001
(.001) (.001) ( .000) (.000)
Height -.000 .000 -.000 .000
(.000) ( .000) (.000) (.000)
Education -.030* -.021 -.016** -.016
(.018) (.019) (.007) ( .015)
Working .041** .037** .017** .030**
( .017) (.019) ( .008) (.015)
Education Husband -.029*** -.023*** -.006** -.014***
( .007) ( .007) (.002) ( .005)
Alcohol .184*** .235*** .055*** .201***
( .035) (.036) ( .020) (.035)
Age Difference -.000 -.001 -.000 .001
( .001) (.001) (.000) ( .000)
Urban -.041** -.031* .001 -.003
( .016) ( .017) (.008) (.014)
Wealth -.002 -.002 .000 -.014
(.007) (.007) ( .003) (.005)
No. Children .016*** .020*** .002 .011***
(.003) (.004) (.001) (.003)
n 3433 3351 3401 3308
R2 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Level of significance is *** 1 Percent, ** 5 Percent, * 10 Percent. Conflict is
a binary measure for provinces highly affected by political violence. Mothers height is measurered in cm. Mothers education is
a binary variable for having primary education. Working is the employment status of women.
Table 11: IV regressions to test for omitted variable bias
First Stage Humiliated Insulted Threatened Beaten
Alcoholism .257*** .331*** .084*** .236***
( .041) ( .040) ( .026) (.040)
F-Value 38.90 65.34 9.83 33.37
Endogeneity 0.47 0.52 0.66 0.51
(P-value)
Second Stage
Height .274 .123 .404 .093
(.567) ( .455) ( 1.774) (.651)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Level of significance is *** 1 Percent, ** 5 Percent, * 10 Percent. Models are
otherwise the same as above. Tests of endogeneity is based on the WU-Hausman test. F-Values from the first stage and for
the instrumental variable are reported.
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Table 12: Robustness check: Wealth quintiles
Poorest Poor Middle Rich Richest
Conflict -1.379*** -1.822*** -1.733*** -.872* -.923**
(.225) ( .310) (.302) ( .461) ( .439)
Humiliated -.271 -.061 .083 .010 .080
(.179) ( .173) (.206) ( .167) ( .221)
N 570 499 452 534 444
R2 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.16
Conflict -1.371*** -1.818 -1.845*** -.875* -.926**
(.229) (.306) ( .294) (.465) ( .443)
Insulted -.202 -.096 -.366* .0126 .086
( .193) (.190) ( .192) (.157) ( .217)
N 564 480 445 517 441
R2 0.27 0.19 0.31 0.20 0.16
Conflict -1.305*** -1.869*** -1.731*** -.876* -1.000***
(.233) ( .334) (.303) ( .456) ( .432)
Threatened -.297 -.376 .078 -.075 -1.646***
(.310) (.356) (.400) (.360) (.352)
N 549 492 451 530 444
R2 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.18
Conflict -1.314*** -1.713*** -1.674*** -.878* -.938**
( .230) ( .310) (.308) ( .463) (.436)
Beaten -.338* -.277 -.019 .028 -.141
( .192) ( .183) (.260) (.234) (.304)
N 550 472 439 519 438
R2 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.21 0.16
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Level of significance is *** 1 Percent, ** 5 Percent, * 10 Percent. Based on
the above models including all fixed effects.
Table 13: Robustness check: different f.e.
Humiliated Insulted Threaten Beaten
Conflict -2.203*** -2.137*** -1.132 -1.822*
( .861) ( .868) (.731) ( .945)
DV -.049 -.085 -.356** -.186*
(.082) ( .082) ( .175) ( .097)
N 2499 2499 2466 2418
R2 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Level of significance is *** 1 Percent, ** 5 Percent, * 10 Percent. Based on
the above models.
Table 14: Robustness check: Accounting for possible community ties
Humiliated Insulted Threatened Beaten
Conflict -1.464*** -1.457*** -1.415*** -1.393***
(.208) (.208) (.215) ( .213)
DV -.036 -.085 -.356* -.189*
( .094) ( .088) (.190) ( .108)
N 2499 2447 2466 2418
R2 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25
Note: Clustered at the community level standard errors are in parentheses. Level of significance is *** 1 Percent, ** 5
Percent, * 10 Percent. Based on the above models including all fixed effects.
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